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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY AS THE SOLE GROUND FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
The Fifth Circuit has devolved a two-pronged test to deter-
mine whether Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responibility
has been violated. After examining the case in which the test
appears, the author concludes that it may become an effective
means of halting attempts to disqualify opposing counsel through
strategic manipulation of ethical rules.
While on active duty for training, Commander Roger Nichols,
a reserve officer with the Navy's Judge Advocate General (JAG)
Corps, entered into an investigation in an effort to aid former pris-
oners of war (POWs) who had lost considerable sums of money in a
securities fraud scheme.' Following his release from duty and return
to private practice, Nichols agreed to a request by one of the ex-
POWs and his wife to continue representing their interests in a
private class action, on a contingency fee basis. Nichols thereafter
filed two suits2 against the aiders and abettors of the securities
fraud.' The United States District Court for the Middle District of
1. See 32 C.F.R. § 727 (1976) which describes the naval legal assistance program. Among
other functions, a legal assistance officer may serve as advocate for eligible personnel in
connection with their personal legal problems (§727.6) and may refer the problem to a civilian
lawyer (§727.9). For further discussion see note 34 infra.
2. Two suits were filed as class actions, as two different series of bonds had been pur-
chased by each group of plaintiffs. The named plaintiff in the suit which is the subject of
this casenote was Dean Woods. The named plaintiff in the other suit was Edward Haglund.
3. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the issues presented a more complete
statement of the facts is set out below.
In November 1974, a federal district court in Florida enjoined a group of broker-dealers
from further perpetration of fraud in the sale of securities to former POWs and civilian
investors. See SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Several
ex-POWs who hoped to recover their investments turned to the Navy's Office of the Judge
Advocate General for assistance. The officer who headed the ensuing investigation consulted
Nichols because of his expertise in the area of securities fraud. Nichols, then completing his
annual two-week tour of duty as a reserve officer in the Judge General Corps., recommended
no action be taken at the time. On December 3, 1974, after Nichols had returned to private
practice, he was contacted by his superior, Captain Fink, to conduct a further investigation
of the matter discussed in November. The following day, Nichols was requested by Com-
mander and Mrs. Woods to represent them and others in a private suit to recover their lost
investments. Nichols told them to await the outcome of his investigation before going further.
On December 16, 1974, Nichols returned to active duty and conducted a five-day investi-
gation. He reported to Captain Fink daily and discussed all conclusions with him. When he
had completed the investigation on December 20, Nichols was released from active duty and
returned to private practice. The Woods contacted Nichols on January 11, 1975, reiterating
their request that he serve as private counsel. Nichols agreed. The contingent fee arrangement
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Alabama, upon motion by opposing counsel, disqualified Nichols'
continued representation as a violation of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,4 on the grounds that he had accepted
private employment for a fee after having had substantial reponsi-
bility in the same subject matter while on active duty for training
as a public employee.' On interlocutory appeal,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, reversed: A naval reserve
officer on active duty for training who performed an investigation
which subsequently became the basis for a private class action
should not be disqualified from representation in the private suit on
the basis of Canon 9 because there was neither (1) a specifically
identifiable appearance of improper conduct nor (2) a likelihood
that public suspicion outweighed the social interests served by the
attorney's continued involvement in the case. Woods v. Covington
County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). 7
Canon 9 requires that a. lawyer avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety. This responsibility has received consider-
able attention in recent years in response to motions for disqualifi-
was personally approved by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Shortly thereafter, the
two private class actions were filed.
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, Canon 9 (1975) states that "a lawyer
should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."
The Code has been used as a guide in the federal courts to decide issues raised by motions
to disqualify. See Note, Disqualification of Counsel for the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 343 (1976). The district courts' power to decide such issues
is derived from their supervisory authority over the attorneys who appear before them. See,
e.g., Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975) (courts have not
only the supervisory power, but also the duty to disqualify counsel for unethical conduct).
5. Nichols' law firm also was disqualified from continued representation. 537 F.2d at 807.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1966). An interlocutory appeal based on a disqualification order has
been held proper because it involves "a collateral matter severable from the underlying suit,
and too important to be denied review at this time." In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity
Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 85 (5th Cir. 1976).
7. The standard of review used by some appellate courts in reviewing a lower court's
ruling on a disqualification motion has been whether the trial judge abused his discretion.
E.g., Lefrakh v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1975).
In Woods, the court found no distinction between the case before it and any other case
where only a question of law was at issue. Consequently, it applied a broader standard of
review than "abuse of discretion." It carefully examined the lower court's decision "to deter-
mine whether . . . [the] . . . disqualification order was predicated upon a proper under-
standing of applicable ethical principles." 537 F.2d at 810. Other Fifth Circuit cases which
have used this standard of review are: American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125
(5th Cir. 1971) (disqualification order reversed because it was found to controvert controlling
ethical principles), and Uniweld Products, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.2d 992 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968), (lower court's refusal to disqualify upheld
because its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous).
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cation. In most cases, the decisions address conduct specifically
covered in the Code by another ethical standard' in addition to
Cannon 9.9 In Woods, the court was faced with an attorney's con-
duct covered only by the sweeping caution of Canon 9. To resolve
the issue of whether the attorney should be disqualified on the facts
presented, the court carefully examined Canon 9 in its historic and
modern perspective.
Initially, it is significant to recognize that Canon 9 was not
explicitly delineated anywhere in the Canons of Professional Ethics,
predecessor to the modern Code of Professional Responsibility.
However, the "appearance of evil" doctrine is not new. It was im-
plicit in the earlier Code,'" as illustrated by the following excerpt
from the Preamble: "[Justice] cannot be . . . maintained unless
the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are
such as to merit the approval of all just men."
The "appearance of evil" doctrine, representing the legal pro-
fession's desire for public approval, is also found in pre-Canon 9 case
law. In United States v. Trafficante," a suit to enforce federal tax
liens, defendant's attorney had been employed in the office of the
Internal Revenue Service and had handled tax claims against the
defendants in the years for which the government was asserting tax
deficiencies. The claims were settled and stipulated decisions were
entered in the Tax Court during the attorney's employment. Con-
trary to informal advice from an Assistant Attorney General in the
Justice Department, the attorney agreed to represent the defen-
dants in the suit to foreclose the liens.
8. The most common sections involved in disqualification controversies are Canons 4 and
5, and DR 9-101(B). See note 10 infra. Canon 4 states that "a lawyer should preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client." Canon 5 states that "a lawyer should exercise indepen-
dent professional judgment on behalf of a client." DR 9-101(B) requires that "a lawyer shall
not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while
he was a public employee."
9. See, e.g., NCK Org., Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976) (Canon 4); Cinema
5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976) (Canon 5); International Elecs. Corp.
v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975) (Canons 4 and 5); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975) (Canon 4); General Motors Corp. v. City
of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (DR 9-101(B)); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (Canon 4). But see Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (only considerations applicable were those underlying Canon 9).
10. The "appearance of evil" doctrine was also implied in the predecessors to Canons
29 (duty to uphold the profession's honor) and 32 (duty to be loyal to the law and to the public
trust).
11. 328 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1964).
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In reversing the district court's denial of a disqualification
order, the court stated: "[An attorney's] conduct should not be
weighed with hair-splitting nicety. We have found no exceptions to
the exhortation to 'abstain from all appearance of evil.""' The court
then cleared the record of any intimation of intentional wrong or any
suggestion of turpitude by the attorney.
The embodiment of the "appearance of evil" doctrine in the
form of Canon 9 did not change the nature or purpose of the concept.
Actual wrongdoing is not a factor when evaluating the conduct of
the attorney. Rather, the intention of the Code is primarily to main-
tain the public's trust in the legal profession.' 3 To accomplish this
goal, the Code specifies certain conduct that would create an ap-
pearance of impropriety.' 4 However, Canon 9 is not limited to these
specifics, it is "all inclusive."' 5
The broad brush of Canon 9 has recently been applied to cases
involving alleged disclosure of client confidences. Warning against
this, Canon 4 of the Code states that "a lawyer should preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client." In Emle Industries, Inc. v.
Patentex, Inc.,'6 an attorney who had previously represented the
parent corporation was suing a subsidiary of that corporation in a
matter involving issues identical to those of the first suit. The mo-
tion for disqualification asserted that the attorney might con-
sciously or unconsciously disclose confidential information acquired
while representing the parent. In affirming the disqualification
order, the court held that it need not determine whether the lawyer
actually received information which could be used to the former
client's disadvantage.'7 The considerations underlying Canon 9 re-
quired disqualification to avoid "even a semblance of improper con-
duct."'" It appears that the attorney was disqualified in the absence
12. Id. at 120.
13. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974).
14. See DR 9-101(A) (private employment after serving in a judicial capacity upon the
same matter); DR 9-101(B) (private employment after being a public employee having sub-
stantial responsibility in same matter); DR 9-101(C) (stating or implying ability to impro-
perly influence any tribunal, legislature, or public official).
15. R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 125 (2d ed. 1970). See also J. P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt,
523 F.2d 1357, 1359, (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concurring), where it was observed that the
Code of Professional Responsibility should not be treated as a statute that the court has no
right to amend.
16. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
17. Id. at 571.
18. Id. at 575.
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of an apparent breach of Canon 4 because of the added caution of
Canon 9.11
Comparable' to the cases involving conduct by an attorney
which is directly covered by an ethical standard in the Code, 20 are
those cases in which disqualification is based soley on the considera-
tions which underlie specific standards. This was the situation in
Handelman v. Weiss.' The plaintiffs, purchasers of securities, al-
leged deceptive or negligent practices in violation of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. Plaintiffs' attorney pre-
viously had been counsel to a trustee who was liquidating the corpo-
ration involved in the alleged securities fraud. The court said that
Canon 4 was not applicable because the defendants had not been
clients of the attorney. DR 9-101(B) was not directly involved be-
cause the attorney had not been employed by the government. How-
ever, the court found that the attorney was in many respects
"representative of governmental interests,"2 and accordingly dis-
qualified him because of many of the same considerations which
prompted the adoption of DR 9-101(B).
Woods shows an attenuation of Handelman's principle of bas-
ing a disqualification on considerations underlying a specific ethical
standard. In Woods, the court found that the attorney's conduct was
covered neither by a specific ethical standard nor by considerations
underlying any specific standard. 3 Yet the case was on appeal from
an order disqualifying the attorney.
The basis of defendants'2 4 motion for disqualification in the
lower court was DR 9-101(B), which prohibits a lawyer from accept-
ing private employement in a matter in which he had substantial
19. See, 25 CATH. U. L. REv., supra note 4, at 356.
20. See, e.g., cases cited in note 9 supra.
21. 368 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. Id. at 263. The attorney was acting in his capacity as counsel for the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a non-profit organization authorized by Congress to
protect the public investor. SIPC is not a federal agency but its Board of Directors is ap-
pointed by the federal government, including five directors appointed by the President with
the Senate's advice and consent.
23. Appellants had characterized opposing counsel's brief as echoing throughout "with
the hollow allegation of an appearance of impropriety." Reply Brief for Appellant at 45.
24. The defendants in this case were not the broker-dealers who originally were tried by
the SEC. These earlier actions had resulted in the recovery of only a small percentage of the
total amount lost. Brief for Appellant at 3. To enable the plaintiffs to recover more of their
lost investments, suit was filed against aiders and abettors in the fraudulent scheme. Coving-
ton County Bank, the named defendant, was the trustee bank, disbursing portions of the bond
proceeds and delivering the bonds upon payment.
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responsibility prior to his leaving government employment.25 The
order of the lower court stated that "it is not essential to the Court's
findings that Nichols was, in fact, a public employee while acting
as a Naval legal assistance officer."2 The appellate court disagreed
with this reasoning and found that Nichols was not a "public em-
ployee" within the meaning of DR 9-101(B). It relied upon a federal
statute which declares that "inactive reservists and those on active
duty for training are not federal employees."27
The court did not halt its consideration of the ethical issues at
this point.2" Upon observing that the federal statute did not exempt
reservists from the caution of Canon 9, the court developed a com-
prehensive two-part test designed to determine when an attorney
should be disqualified for an appearance of impropriety. First, the
congressional policy underlying the statute requires that disqualifi-
cation orders under Canon 9 "be based on a specifically identifiable
appearance of improper conduct."29 After this threshold issue is
resolved, and before the attorney can be disqualified, "a court must
also find that the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy out-
weighs the social interests which will be served by a lawyer's contin-
ued participation in a particular case."
3
The court applied this two-part test to the facts before it. First,
it concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that Nichols
had violated the public trust while on active duty3' or that he had
25. See also EC 9-3.
26. Brief for Appellant at 5, quoting from the district court's opinion.
27. 537 F.2d at 810-11, quoting 5 U.S.C. § 2105(d) (1970).
28. The Amicus Curiae brief filed by the Judge Advocates Associaton had expressed the
hope that the court would address itself to the broader aspects of the case, rather than simply
handing down a "reversed on other grounds" decision. Brief for Judge Advocates Association
as Amicus Curiae at 3 n.1.
29. 537 F.2d at 812. After the court developed this standard it evaluated the situation
assuming the absence of the federal statute. The court considered the role of Canon 9 in
general and warned that an attorney's conduct should not be judged by cynical members of
the public. In realizing the possibilities for abuse of Canon 9's "appearance of evil" doctrine,
the court concluded that the "specifically identifiable" test should be applied whenever
Canon 9 is asserted as a basis for disqualification.
30. Id. at 813 n.12.
31. The possibility of violating the public's trust usually manifests itself in those situa-
tions where a government attorney is in a position to follow into private practice what he
began with government resources. For example, in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,
501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974), the City of New York had sued a bus manufacturer, alleging
unlawful monopoly. The City's attorney had formerly been employed by the Justice Depart-
ment. In this position, he had had substantial responsibility in the investigation of an earlier
antitrust action against the defendant. After finding that the issues involved in the two cases
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used imporper imformation acquired while on active duty to the
disadvantage of the defendants. The court also rejected the district
court's contention that the defendants would be economically33 and
strategically disadvantaged by the knowledge Nichols had obtained
while a reservist and brought into the private litigation. It found the
district court's reasoning overlooked the fact that the very essence
of a public legal aid program is that the recipient is entitled to the
services rendered on his behalf.34
Because the court found no reasonably identifiable possibility
of improper conduct by Nichols, the second part of the test techni-
cally did not have to be applied. However, application of the test
to the Woods facts illustrates how Cannon 9's broad caveat can be
abused and "ultimately be self-defeating."35 The social interests
contemplated by the court were "the client's right to counsel of his
choice, the lawyer's right freely to practice his profession, and the
government's need to attract skilled lawyers."3
In this case, the clients were, among others, ex-POWs de-
frauded of their back pay, who sought legal assistance from the
naval reserve organized for this purpose. They were entitled to
choose counsel most familiar with the case 7 and best qualified, in
were sufficiently similar, the court held that the appearance of impropriety must be avoided
by disqualification. For further discussion of this general subject see Kaufman, The Former
Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. Rev. 657 (1957).
32. In Woods, Nichols obtained no more information than he could have obtained work-
ing in a purely private capacity. In fact, during the investigation he specifically stated to the
present defendants that the purpose of his investigation was to determine if there were any
basis for recovery by the ex-POWs against aiders and abettors in the fraudulent scheme. 537
F.2d at 817.
33. The district court was also concerned with the problem of "double remuneration,"
i.e., that Nichols would, in essence, be paid twice. The appellate court pointed out that the
fees in the class action would be set by the district court which could make an adjustment
for the prior investigation. Id. at 817-18.
34. See 32 C.F.R. § 727 (1975). The Navy's legal assistance program was instituted to
maintain morale and efficiency by making resources available to eligible military personnel
in need of legal advice. Among other provisions, the officers who perform the legal assistance
duties are to be guided by the Code of Professional Responsibility (§727.3), are to exercise
independent professional judgement on behalf of their clients (§727.6), and are to preserve
the confidences and privileged character of the services rendered, even in the face of contrary
disclosure orders by superiors (§727.8).
35. 537 F.2d at 813.
36. Id. at 812.
37. Familiarity with the case was crucial since the statute of limitations was to have run
out on some of the claims twelve days after Nichols agreed to private representation. The
court took note of appellant's contention that it would have been virtually impossible for
another lawyer to have taken the case. Id. at 809 n.5.
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their judgment, to successfully handle the suit. Attorney Nichols
had the right to practice his profession as long as he did not conduct
himself in a manner which would violate the public trust. Lastly, it
was deemed vital to the continued operation of the navy's legal
assistance program that reserve officers not be prohibited from tak-
ing cases which went beyond the limited function of the assistance
program and on to in-court representation."
The facts and circumstances presented in Woods are unique
and will rarely present themselves again. The value of the case does
not lie in its fact pattern, but in the two-part test developed by the
court to evaluate an alleged appearance of impropriety. The test
appears to be sufficiently broad so as not to defeat the purpose of
the ABA in promulgating Canon 9, yet it provides a degree of guid-
ance that is necessary to prevent Canon 9 from becoming "a conven-
ient tool for disqualification when the facts simply do not fit within
the rubric of other specific ethical and disciplinary rules.""'
The new test mandates a finding of a specifically identifiable
appearance of impropriety and a balancing of public suspicion
against social interests. Its success in preventing abuse of legal pro-
cess will only be determined in its application. The degree of objec-
tivity injected into the reading of Canon 9 by the "specifically iden-
tifiable" standard should operate to suppress purely strategic mo-
tions for disqualification founded on no real ethical concern, be-
cause the movant will know what he must prove to carry the motion:
More importantly, time consuming and expensive appeals aris-
ing from tactical diversions should become less frequent. Both
judges and attorneys now have a definitive standard by which to
determine appearance of impropriety. The Fifth Circuit has made
it clear that it stands ready to challenge the lower courts for abuse
of discretion in applying the test it has pronounced.
REGINA ZELONKER
38. Id. at 819. See also Brief for Judge Advocates Association as Amicus Curiae at 2,
where it was asserted: "[1]t is the conviction of this association that the lower court's
opinion, if permitted to stand, will constitute a serious obstacle to uniformed lawyers in
performing their function of providing legal assistance services to eligible personnel." .
39. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975). In the course
of seeking grounds to justify disqualification in this case, the court refused to use Canon 9 as
a basis because the appearance of impropriety was not serious.
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